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This paper extends Lucas and Prescott's (1974) search model to develop a notion of rest unemployment.
The economy consists of a continuum of labor markets, each of which produces a heterogeneous good.
There is a constant returns to scale production technology in each labor market, but labor productivity
is continually hit by idiosyncratic shocks, inducing the costly reallocation of workers across labor
markets.  Under some conditions, some workers may be rest-unemployed, waiting for local labor market
conditions to improve, rather than engaged in time consuming search.  The model has distinct notions
of unemployment (moving to a new labor market or waiting for labor market conditions to improve)
and inactivity (enjoying leisure while disconnected from the labor market).  We obtain closed-form
expressions for key aggregate variables and use them to evaluate the model. Quantitatively, we find















This paper distinguishes “search” and “rest” unemployment. Search unemployment is a
costly reallocation activity in which workers look for the best available employment opportu-
nities. Rest unemployment is a less costly activity where a worker waits for her current labor
market conditions to improve. While one might naturally think of temporary layoﬀs as the
empirical counterpart of rest unemployment, we believe it corresponds to a more common
phenomenon. We view anyone who is not currently working but still loosely attached to an
industry where she previously worked as rest-unemployed.
We construct a model where there is a role for both search and rest unemployment. We
then use the model to ask whether economies with diﬀerent amounts of search and rest unem-
ployment would behave diﬀerently and whether the life of a worker in search unemployment
is substantially diﬀerent from that of one in rest unemployment. We use the answers to
evaluate the importance of search and rest unemployment in the U.S. economy.
Our model is an extension of Lucas and Prescott’s (1974) search model. The economy
consists of a continuum of sectors, each of which produces a heterogeneous intermediate good
which aggregates into the ﬁnal consumption good using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology with con-
stant elasticity of substitution θ. Each intermediate good is produced with a constant returns
to scale technology using labor only. Labor productivity is continually hit by idiosyncratic
shocks whose growth rate has a constant expected value and a constant variance per unit of
time. Households have standard time additive preferences. In any time period, households
can use their time endowment to engage in four mutually exclusive activities, from which
they derive diﬀerent amounts of leisure: work, search unemployment, rest unemployment,
and inactivity, i.e. out of the labor force.
We assume that the reallocation of workers across intermediate good sectors requires
search unemployment. Because of that we refer interchangeably to intermediate good sectors
as labor markets. A worker in a given labor market can either work, engage in rest unemploy-
ment, or leave her current labor market. A rest-unemployed worker is available to return to
work in that labor market, and that labor market only, at no cost. If a worker leaves her labor
market she can either be inactive or engage in search unemployment. A search-unemployed
worker ﬁnds a job after a random, exponentially distributed amount of time, upon which she
can locate in the market of her choosing. Thus, search is directed as in Lucas and Prescott
(1974). Finally, workers can costlessly move between search unemployment and inactivity.
We study stationary competitive equilibria with complete markets. Equivalently, we
assume that the household is composed of a large number of members. This implies that a
household values the contribution of the earnings of their members in terms of their expected
1discounted values. Firms producing a given intermediate good take as given the aggregate
output of the ﬁnal good and the price of all intermediate goods. Labor demand in each
market has elasticity θ, due to the eﬀect of sectoral output on its relative price. Idiosyncratic
productivity shocks shift the demand for labor. Wages are determined competitively in each
labor market and so depend on the number of workers in the labor market and on labor
productivity.
To characterize the equilibrium, let ω denote the log of the wage that would prevail in
a particular labor market if all workers in the market were employed, i.e. if there were no
rest unemployment; we measure wages in utility-equivalent units. The behavior of workers in
diﬀerent labor markets is characterized by three threshold values ω ≤ ˆ ω < ¯ ω. Workers who
have successfully concluded their search process arrive in the best labor markets, which keeps
ω below ¯ ω in all labor markets. Workers in depressed labor markets leave to become search
unemployed, which keeps ω above ω. In markets with ω > ˆ ω there is full employment and
the log wage is ω. For ω < ˆ ω, wages stay at ˆ ω and the rest unemployment rate in the market
increases. Workers engaged in rest unemployment stay in depressed labor markets waiting
for conditions to improve. If conditions get bad enough, ω = ω, they leave the market.
Depending on parameter values, there may be no rest unemployment, ˆ ω = ω.
We solve our model in continuous time, with log productivity following a Brownian mo-
tion. Workers’ decision on when to enter and exit labor markets implies that ω is a regulated
Brownian motion, with barriers given by the endogenously determined thresholds ω and ¯ ω.
Any barriers ω and ¯ ω imply an invariant distribution of ω across workers. Aggregating across
workers, we then determine the value of ﬁnal output and the employment and unemploy-
ment rates. We obtain simple characterizations of key endogenous variables, including a pair
of equations for the two thresholds ω and ¯ ω and closed-form solutions for the labor force
participation rate, unemployment rate, and share of searchers in the unemployment pool.
The closed form solution facilitates comparative statics and a quantitative evaluation of
the model. We ﬁnd a tight relationship between the search unemployment rate and the
autocorrelation of wages at the labor market level. Using data for ﬁve-digit North American
Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) industries, we show that annual average weekly
earnings at the industry level are essentially a random walk. According to our model, this
implies that labor markets rarely hit the barriers ¯ ω and ω that regulate wages. But since
a labor market must move from the upper barrier to the lower barrier in order for a newly
hired worker to enter search unemployment, it follows that the model cannot simultaneously
generate strongly autocorrelated wages and signiﬁcant amounts of search unemployment. Our
calibrations suggest that the search unemployment rate—the ratio of search unemployment
to the labor force—is less than 0.5%. One tension with our conclusion that the search
2unemployment rate is small is that it requires a relatively large cost of search. We conjecture
that the introduction of labor market-speciﬁc human capital accumulation will substantially
reduce the necessary search cost, a topic that we leave for future research.
Rest provides a complementary source of unemployment. We ﬁnd that the model is able
to generate signiﬁcant levels of rest unemployment with plausible parameters, while still
being consistent with the autocorrelation and standard deviation of wages in the data. In
particular, although rest provides almost as much leisure as inactivity, the transition rate
from rest unemployment back to employment is high, approximately 1/2t per unit of time
at short unemployment durations t. We also ﬁnd that rest unemployment can explain why
measures of job creation and job destruction are a concave function of the time horizon.
For labor markets with rest unemployment, creation and destruction are frequently reversed,
inducing the observed concavity. With only search unemployment, creation and destruction
would be nearly linear functions of elapsed time.
Our model is closely related to Lucas and Prescott (1974). There are three signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the models. First, we introduce rest unemployment to the framework.
Second, we make particular assumptions on the stochastic process for productivity which
enable us to obtain closed-form solutions; however, we believe our insights, e.g. on the link
between search unemployment and the autocorrelation of wages and on the role of rest un-
employment, carry over to alternative productivity processes. Finally, in Lucas and Prescott
(1974), all labor markets produce a homogeneous good but there are diminishing returns to
scale in each labor market. In our model, each labor market produce a heterogeneous good
and has constant returns to scale. We believe this approach is more attractive because the
extent of diminishing returns is determined by the elasticity of substitution between goods,
which is potentially more easily measurable than the degree of decreasing returns on variable
inputs (Atkeson, Khan, and Ohanian, 1996). An online Appendix B.2 tightens the connec-
tions between these models by solving a market social planner’s problem and proving that
the equilibrium is eﬃcient.
Our concept of rest unemployment is closely related to the one used in Jovanovic (1987),
from whom we borrow the term.1 While in both his model and ours search and rest unem-
ployment coexist, the aims of both papers and hence the setup of the models are diﬀerent.
Jovanovic (1987) focuses on the cyclical behavior of unemployment and productivity, and so
allows for both idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity shocks. But to be able to analyze the
1Our decision to use this name was not easy. An obvious alternative is “wait unemployment,” but the
literature uses this to refer to workers who wait for a job in a high wage primary labor market rather than
accept a readily available job in a low wage secondary labor market. Although workers in rest unemployment
are waiting for a job, their behavior is quite diﬀerent from those referred to in this literature. Our concept
of rest unemployment corresponds closely to one notion of structural unemployment; see, for example Abel
and Bernanke (2001, p. 95).
3model with aggregate shocks, Jovanovic (1987) assumes that at the end of each period, there
is exactly one worker in each location. This implies that search unemployment is socially
wasteful. Our model illustrates how search unemployment may play an important role in
reallocating workers away from severely depressed labor markets, while rest unemployment
may be an eﬃcient use of workers’ time in marginal labor markets.
King (1990) and Gouge and King (1997) also develop models of rest unemployment in the
Lucas and Prescott (1974) framework. King (1990) focuses on comparative statics of rest and
search unemployment, while Gouge and King (1997) reexamine the business cycle issues in
Jovanovic (1987), especially the ﬁnding that rest unemployment is likely to be countercyclical,
consistent with empirical evidence but not with many models of reallocation. Both papers
assume that the idiosyncratic productivity shock follows a two-state Markov process. This
coarse parameterization has the advantage of making the analysis tractable but complicates
the mapping from model to data. Instead, we ﬁnd that when log productivity follows a
Brownian motion, the model is still tractable and the mapping from model to data is direct.
In Section 2, we describe the economic environment. We analyze a special case where
workers can immediately move to the best labor market in Section 3. Without any search
cost, there no rest unemployment, since either working in the best labor market or dropping
out of the labor force dominates this activity. Instead, idiosyncratic productivity shocks lead
to a continual reallocation of workers across labor markets.
Section 4 characterizes the stationary equilibrium of the economy. Although the microe-
conomic structure of our model is rich, we can characterize the equilibrium as the solution
to a system of two equations in two endogenous variables and various model parameters.
The system is simple in the sense that we can express the equations in closed form. We
prove that the equilibrium is unique and show that it is easy to compute and perform com-
parative statics. In particular, we ﬁnd that there is rest unemployment only if the cost in
terms of foregone leisure is low. We also provide closed form expressions for the employ-
ment, search unemployment, and rest unemployment rates. While the unemployment rates
depend a comparison of the relative advantage of diﬀerent leisure activities—search, rest,
and inactivity—the employment rate depends on a comparison of market versus nonmarket
activity.
Section 5 uses our model to understand the extent of search and rest unemployment in the
U.S. economy. The model has trouble simultaneously generating signiﬁcant levels of search
unemployment and strongly autocorrelated wages; however, there is no tension between rest
unemployment and wages. We also show how the presence of rest unemployment aﬀects the
behavior of job creation and destruction and the hazard rate of ﬁnding a job. The model
with rest unemployment is broadly in line with the data, while the model with only search
4is not.
Section 6 uses our model to ask whether economies with diﬀerent amounts of search and
rest unemployment can be distinguished and whether the life of a worker in search unem-
ployment is substantially diﬀerent from that of one in rest unemployment. Our preliminary
conclusions are aﬃrmative and support our ﬁnding that rest unemployment may be an em-
pirically important phenomenon.
2 Model
We consider a continuous time, inﬁnite-horizon model. We focus for simplicity on an aggre-
gate steady state and assume markets are complete.
2.1 Intermediate Goods
There is a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Each good is produced
in a separate labor market with a constant returns to scale technology that uses only labor.
In a typical labor market j at time t, there is a measure l(j,t) workers. Of these, e(j,t) are
employed, each producing Ax(j,t) units of good j, while the remaining l(j,t) − e(j,t) are
rest-unemployed. The price of good j, p(j,t), and the wage in labor market j, w(j,t), are
determined competitively at each instant t. We use the ﬁnal good as the numeraire.
A is the aggregate component in productivity while x(j,t) is an idiosyncratic shock that
follows a geometric random walk,
dlogx(j,t) = µxdt + σxdz(j,t), (1)
where µx measures the drift of log productivity, σx > 0 measures the standard deviation, and
z(j,t) is a standard Wiener process, independent across labor markets.
To keep a well-behaved distribution of labor productivity, we assume that labor market
j shuts down according to a Poisson process with arrival rate δ, independent across labor
markets and independent of labor market j’s productivity. When this shock hits, all the
workers are forced out of the market. A new labor market, also named j, enters with positive
initial productivity x ∼ F(x), keeping the total measure of labor markets constant. We
assume a law of large numbers, so the share of labor markets experiencing any particular
sequence of shocks is deterministic.
52.2 Final Goods
A competitive ﬁnal goods producing sector combines the intermediate goods using the con-
stant returns to scale technology
Y (t) =








where y(j,t) is the input of good j at time t and θ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across
goods. We assume θ  = 1 throughout the paper and comment in Section 3 on the role of
this assumption. The ﬁnal goods sector takes the price of the intermediate goods {p(j,t)} as





There is a representative household consisting of a measure 1 of members. The large house-
hold structure allows for full risk sharing within each household, a standard device for study-
ing complete markets allocations.
At each moment in time t, each member of the representative household engages in one
of the following mutually exclusive activities:
• L(t) household members are located in one of the intermediate goods (or equivalently
labor) markets.
– E(t) of these workers are employed at the prevailing wage and get leisure 0.
– Ur(t) = L(t) − E(t) of these workers are rest-unemployed and get leisure br.
• Us(t) household members are search-unemployed, looking for a new labor market and
getting leisure bs.
• The remaining 1−E(t)−Ur(t)−Us(t) household members are inactive, getting leisure
bi.
We assume bi > bs. Household members may costlessly switch between employment and rest
unemployment and between inactivity and searching; however, they cannot switch intermedi-
ate goods markets without going through a spell of search unemployment. Workers exit their
intermediate goods market for inactivity or search in three circumstances: ﬁrst, they may do
so endogenously at any time at not cost; second, they must do when their market shuts down,
6which happens at rate δ; and third, they must do so when they are hit by an idiosyncratic
shock, according to a Poisson process with arrival rate q, independent across individuals
and independent of their labor market’s productivity. We introduce the idiosyncratic “quit”
shock q to account for separations that are unrelated to the state of the industry. Finally, a
worker in search unemployment ﬁnds a job according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
α. When this happens, she may enter the intermediate goods market of her choice.







1 − E(t) − Ur(t) − Us(t)
 
+ brUr(t) + bsUs(t)
 
dt, (4)
where ρ > 0 is the discount rate, u is increasing, diﬀerentiable, strictly concave, and satisﬁes
the Inada conditions u′(0) = ∞ and limC→∞ u′(C) = 0, and C(t) is the household’s con-
sumption of the ﬁnal good. The household ﬁnances its consumption using its labor income.
2.4 Equilibrium
We look for a competitive equilibrium of this economy. At each instant, each household
chooses how much to consume and how to allocate its members between employment in
each labor market, rest unemployment in each labor market, search unemployment, and
inactivity, in order to maximize utility subject to technological constraints on reallocating
members across labor markets, taking as given the stochastic process for wages in each labor
market; each ﬁnal goods producer maximizes proﬁts by choosing inputs taking as given the
price for all the intermediate goods; and each intermediate goods producer j maximizes
proﬁts by choosing how many workers to hire taking as given the wage in its labor market
and the price of its good. Moreover, the demand for labor from intermediate goods producers
is equal to the supply from households in each intermediate goods market; the demand for
intermediate goods from the ﬁnal goods producers is equal to the supply from intermediate
goods producers; and the demand for ﬁnal goods from the households is equal to the supply
from the ﬁnal goods producers.
Standard arguments imply that for given initial conditions, there is at most one compet-
itive equilibrium of this economy.2 We look for a stationary equilibrium where all aggregate
quantities and the joint distribution of wages, productivity, output, employment, and rest
unemployment across labor markets are constant. With identical households and complete
markets, consumption is equal to current labor income and hence we ignore ﬁnancial markets
2The ﬁrst welfare theorem implies that any equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Since there is only one type
of household, if there were multiple equilibria, household utility would be equal in each. But a convex
combination of the equilibrium allocations would be feasible and Pareto superior, a contradiction.
7in the remainder of this paper.
3 Costless Mobility
To understand the mechanics of the model, we start with a version where nonworkers can
instantaneously become workers; formally, this is equivalent to the limit of the model when
α → ∞. In this limit, the household does not need to devote any workers to search unem-
ployment. Moreover, for bi > br there is no rest unemployment, since with costless mobility,
resting is dominated by inactivity. Thus the household divides its time between employment
and inactivity. Finally, with costless mobility all workers must earn a common, constant
wage w.







u(wE(t)) + bi(1 − E(t))
 
dt,
The ﬁrst order conditions imply that at each date t, E ≤ 1 and bi ≤ wu′(Ew) with comple-
mentary slackness; note that the Inada condition u′(0) = ∞ rules out the possibility of zero
employment.
To close the model, we compute the equilibrium wage. Consider an intermediate goods
market with productivity x and l workers. Output is Q(l,x) = lAx and so equation (3)




 1/θ. Then since workers are paid their marginal








Since wages are equalized across markets, W(l,x) = w, this pins down the relationship
between productivity and employment across labor markets. When θ > 1, more productive
labor markets employ more workers, while if goods are poor substitutes, θ < 1, an increase
in labor productivity lowers employment so as to keep output relatively constant. In the
special case of θ = 1, employment is constant and equal to Y/w in all labor markets. This is
a simple but uninteresting case and so we omit its analysis from the rest of the paper.
Using equation (5), substitute Q(l,x) = lAx =
Y (Ax)θ
wθ into equation (2) and simplify to
show that the wage is a weighted average of productivity across markets,
w = A







8With an invariant distribution for x, we can rewrite equation (6) by integrating across that
distribution. Appendix A.1 ﬁnds an expression for the invariant distribution, which requires
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δ > (θ − 1)
 
















Condition (7) imposes that the exit rate of markets must be suﬃciently large, the drift and
variance of productivity suﬃciently small, or that the elasticity of substitution suﬃciently
close to 1. If this parameter restriction were to fail with θ > 1, the wage w would be
inﬁnite because extremely productive ﬁrms would produce an enormous amount of easily-
substitutable goods; with θ < 1, the wage would be zero because very unproductive ﬁrms
would require a huge amount of labor to produce any of the poorly-substitutable goods.
Condition (9) restricts the distribution of productivity in new markets for the same reasons.
For future reference, we note two important properties of the frictionless wage. First, if
µx+(θ−1)σ2
x/2 = 0, w = AX0, independent of δ. We introduced the assumption that δ > 0
mainly for technical convenience, so imposing the restriction µx + (θ − 1)σ2
x/2 = 0 allows to
focus on the limit as δ converges to zero; we do so in Section 5. The condition is equivalent
to imposing that xθ−1 is a martingale which, by equation (5), implies employment l is a
martingale. If employment were a supermartingale, output would converge to zero for small
δ, while if it were a submartingale output would converge to inﬁnity. Second, because of
constant returns to scale, the wage depends on technology but not on preference parameters.
This implies that an increase in the leisure value of inactivity bi raises the marginal utility
of consumption u′(C) by the same proportion, while employment E decreases in proportion
to C. Similar properties hold in the frictional model, to which we turn now.
4 Characterization of Equilibrium
We now return to the model where it takes time to ﬁnd a new labor market, α < ∞. We look
for a steady state equilibrium where the household maintains constant consumption, obtains
9a constant income stream, and keeps a positive and constant fraction of its workers in each
of the activities, employment, rest unemployment, search unemployment, and inactivity. In
equilibrium, in each labor market, which is characterized by productivity x and the number
of workers l, the ratio xθ−1/l follows a Markov process. Workers enter labor markets when
the ratio exceeds a threshold and exit labor markets when it falls below a strictly smaller
threshold.
4.1 The Marginal Value of Household Members
We start by computing the marginal value of an additional household member engaged in
each of the three activities. These are related by the possibility of reallocating household
members.
Consider ﬁrst a household member who is permanently inactive. It is immediate from





to household utility. Since the household may freely shift workers between inactivity and
search unemployment, this must also be the incremental value of a searcher, assuming some
members are engaged in each activity. A searcher gets ﬂow utility bs and the possibility of
ﬁnding a labor market at rate α, giving capital ¯ v − v, where ¯ v is the value to the household
of having a worker in the best labor market. This implies ρv = bs + α(¯ v − v) or










is a measure of search costs, the percentage loss in current utility from searching rather
than inactivity times the expected duration of search unemployment 1/α. Conversely, a
worker may freely exit her labor market, and so the lower bound on the value of a household
member in a labor market, either employed or search unemployed, is v. If the household
values a worker at some intermediate amount, it will be willing to keep her in her labor
market rather than having her search for a new one.
Finally, consider the margin between employment and resting for a worker in a labor
market paying a wage w. An employed worker generates income valued at u′(C)w, while a
resting worker generates br utils. Since switching between employment and resting is costless,
all workers are employed in any labor market with w > br/u′(C), and all workers are resting
in any market with w < br/u′(C). In the intermediate case, some may be employed and some
resting.
104.2 Wage and Labor Force Dynamics
Consider a labor market with l workers and productivity x. Let P(l,x) denote the price of
its good, Q(l,x) denote the amount of the good produced, W(l,x) denote the wage rate, and
E(l,x) denote the number of workers who are employed. Competition ensures that the wage
is equal to the marginal product of labor, W(l,x) = P(l,x)Ax, while the production function
implies Q(l,x) = E(l,x)Ax. Combining these conditions with the intermediate good demand















is the logarithm of the “full-employment wage” measured in utils, the wage that would prevail
if there were full employment in the labor market.3 When eω > br, the wage exceeds the
value of leisure and so there is no rest unemployment. Otherwise, enough workers rest to the
raise the wage to br/u′(C).
Since the wage only depends on ω, we look for an equilibrium in which workers immedi-
ately enter any labor market with ω > ¯ ω and exit any labor market with ω < ω, where the
thresholds ω ≤ ¯ ω are determined endogenously. There is neither entry nor endogenous exits
from labor markets with ω ∈ (ω, ¯ ω), although a fraction of the workers qdt quit during an
interval of time dt. We allow for the possibility that ω = −∞ so workers never exit labor
markets. When a positive shock hits a labor market j with ω(j,t) = ¯ ω, ω stays constant and
the labor force l increases. Conversely, negative shocks reduce ω, with l falling as workers
exogenously quit the market. At ω < ω(j,t) < ¯ ω, both positive and negative shocks aﬀect ω,
while l falls deterministically at rate q. When ω(j,t) = ω, a negative shock reduces l without
aﬀecting ω, while a positive shock raises ω, with l falling due to quits.
If there is an equilibrium with this property, its deﬁnition in equation (14) implies ω(j,t)
is a regulated Brownian motion in each market j. When ω(j,t) ∈ (ω, ¯ ω), only productivity







dt = µdt + σωdz(j,t), (15)
3Note that eω is analogous to R(Ax,l) in Lucas and Prescott’s (1974) notation. Their production tech-
nology implies that Y does not aﬀect R, while risk-neutrality ensures that u′(C) is constant. Lucas and











σx, and σ ≡ |σω|,
i.e., in this range ω(j,t) has drift µ and instantaneous standard deviation σ. When the
thresholds ω and ¯ ω are ﬁnite, they act as reﬂecting barriers, since productivity shocks that
would move ω outside the boundaries are oﬀset by the entry and exit of workers. If we
allowed θ = 1, productivity shocks would be oﬀset by price changes in a way that leaves the
wage unchanged and so µ = q and σ = 0, an uninteresting case that would require a separate
analysis.
4.3 Labor Force Participant Value Function
We return now to the value of a worker in a labor market with productivity x and with
l workers. Since the wage only depends on ω, a regulated Brownian motion, we look for
an equilibrium where the worker’s value depends only on ω. Given arbitrary values for the
barriers ω ≤ ¯ ω, we can deﬁne the incremental value to the household of having a worker in
a market with current productivity ω0 as
v(ω0;ω, ¯ ω) = E











  ω(0) = ω0
 
, (16)
where expectations are taken with respect to future values of the random variable ω(t) and
λ ≡ q + δ
is the rate at which workers exogenously exit markets. The discount rate ρ+λ accounts both
for impatience and for the possibility that the labor market ends exogenously. The time-t
payoﬀ is the prevailing wage; this holds whether the worker is employed or rest-unemployed
because when there is rest unemployment, the worker is indiﬀerent between the two states.
In addition, if the worker exogenously leaves the market, which happens with hazard rate λ,
the household gets a terminal value v.
The utility of a worker in any market must be between v and ¯ v. If she is in the best
possible market, her utility must be ¯ v so searchers are willing to take a job there. If she is in
the worst possible market, her utility must be v so she is indiﬀerent about exiting her labor
12market; such a market exists only if the lower threshold is ﬁnite.
v(ω;ω, ¯ ω) ∈ [v, ¯ v] for all ω
v(¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω) = ¯ v (17)
v(ω;ω, ¯ ω) = v if ω > −∞.
To characterize the thresholds further, deﬁne
Π(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) ≡ E






    ω(0) = ω0
 
,
where Iω(ω(t)) is an indicator function, equal to 1 if ω(t) < ω and equal to zero otherwise.
This discounted occupancy function evaluates to zero at ω ≤ ω and to 1
ρ+λ at ω ≥ ¯ ω. We use
Πω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) for the density of ω or the discounted local time function, where the subscript
denotes the partial derivative with respect to the ﬁrst argument. Then switching the order of
integration in equation (16), which is permissible since for −∞ ≤ ω ≤ ¯ ω < ∞ and ρ+λ > 0,
the function max{br,eω} + λv is integrable, we get
v(ω0;ω, ¯ ω) =
  ¯ ω
ω
(max{br,e
ω} + λv)Πω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω)dω. (18)
The value of being in a market with current log full-employment wage ω0 is equal to the
expected value of future ω weighted by the appropriate discounted local time function.
Equation (18) is convenient because Πω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) is a known function (Stokey, 2006).
It is worth noting that equations (17) and (18) imply some familiar conditions:
(ρ + λ)v(ω0;ω, ¯ ω) = max{br,e
ω} + λv + µvω0(ω0;ω, ¯ ω) +
σ2
2
vω0,ω0(ω0;ω, ¯ ω), (19)
and vω0(¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω) = vω0(ω;ω, ¯ ω) = 0, (20)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the ﬁrst argument.4 Together
with the “value-matching” conditions v(¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω) = ¯ v and v(ω;ω, ¯ ω) = v in equation (17), this
is an equivalent representation of the labor force participant’s value function.
Using monotonicity of the period payoﬀ function in equation (18) and monotonicity in
the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance of Πω, we can now prove
4The ﬁrst condition, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, can be veriﬁed directly by diﬀerentiating
equation (18) using the deﬁnition of Πω in equation (44). The interested reader can consult the online
Appendix B.1 for the details of the algebra. The second pair of conditions, “smooth-pasting,” follow from
equation (18) because equation (44) implies
∂Πω(ω;ω0;ω,¯ ω)
∂ω0 = 0 when ω0 = ω or ω0 = ¯ ω.
13Lemma 1. v is continuous and nondecreasing in ω0, ω, and ¯ ω. It is strictly increasing in
each argument if ω0 ∈ (ω, ¯ ω) and ¯ ω > logbr.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. Building on this, we characterize the thresholds:
Proposition 1. Equations (17) and (18) uniquely deﬁne ω and ¯ ω as functions of model
parameters. A proportional increase in bi, br, and bs raises eω and e¯ ω by the same proportion.
Moreover, ω < logbi < ¯ ω < ∞, with ω > −∞ if and only if br < bi.
The proof of the Proposition in Appendix A.3 deﬁnes two objects, ¯ Ω(ω) solving v(¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω) ≡ ¯ v
and Ω(¯ ω) solving v(ω;ω, ¯ ω) ≡ v. That is ¯ Ω(ω) gives the value of the upper threshold such that
if workers enter and exit the market to keep ¯ ω ≥ ω ≥ ω, a market at the upper threshold
in fact delivers value ¯ v. Similarly, Ω(¯ ω) gives the value of the lower threshold such that
under the same condition, a market at the lower threshold delivers value v. An equilibrium
is then deﬁned by a ﬁxed point ¯ ω = ¯ Ω(ω) and ω = Ω(¯ ω). Exploiting a single-crossing of the
functions Ω and ¯ Ω, we prove that there exists a unique solution to this pair of equations. The
single-crossing property relies on two key features of the model: the period return function
is monotonic; and an increase in the upper (lower) bound aﬀects the discounted occupancy
function more when ω0 is closer to the upper (lower) bound. Although our proof relies on the
exact functional form of the discounted occupancy function, the properties are likely to hold
more generally when ω is persistent. One can also construct an alternative proof relying on
solving the “island planner’s problem” developed in the online Appendix B.2.
The Proposition establishes that ω is ﬁnite when br < bi. Intuitively, if a market is hit
by suﬃciently adverse shocks, workers will leave since rest unemployment is costly and has
low expected payoﬀs. In contrast, when br ≥ bi, rest unemployment is costless and hence
workers only leave labor markets when they shut down. Moreover, if br ≤ bi, there is no
rest unemployment in the best labor markets, ¯ ω > logbr. The next proposition addresses
whether there is rest unemployment in the worst labor markets, ω ≷ logbr.
Proposition 2. There exists a ¯ br such that in an equilibrium, br   eω if and only if br   ¯ br,
with ¯ br = B(κ,ρ + λ,µ,σ)bi for some function B, positive-valued and decreasing in κ with
B(0,ρ + λ,µ,σ) = 1.
The proof is in Appendix A.4. This Proposition implies that there is rest unemployment
if search costs κ are suﬃciently high given any br > 0, or equivalently if the leisure value of
resting br is suﬃciently close to the leisure of inactivity bi given any κ > 0. If a searcher ﬁnds
a job suﬃciently fast (so κ is small) or resting gives too little leisure (so br is small), there is
no reason to wait for labor market conditions to improve, and so B is monotone in κ.
144.4 Equilibrium
We have solved for the values ω and ¯ ω that describe workers’ incentive to enter and exit
labor markets as functions of model parameters. Taking these thresholds as given, we now
ﬁnd the remaining variables and equations that determine an equilibrium and establish that
they have a unique solution by solving them explicitly. This section is about mechanics and
aggregation given our characterization of optimizing behavior.
The ﬁrst equilibrium condition is that the ﬁnal goods market clears, Y = C.
Next, a key object for us is the stationary distribution of the L workers across log full-
employment wages ω; we denote its density by f deﬁned on [ω, ¯ ω]. Since f is a density,
  ¯ ω
ω
f(ω)dω = 1. (21)
By taking the limit of a discrete time, discrete state-space analog of our model, we prove in
Appendix A.5 that this density has to satisfy three conditions, equations (22)–(24) below.






′′(ω) for all ω ∈ (ω, ¯ ω). (22)
This captures the requirement that inﬂows and outﬂows balance at each point in the support
of the density. Workers exit markets either because of quits or shutdowns at rate λ, while
otherwise ω is a Brownian motion with drift µ and standard deviation σ. Workers whose ω
changes leave this point in the density for higher or lower values of ω, while the density picks
up mass from points above and below when they are hit by appropriate shocks. In a short
period of time, this relates the density of f at nearby points, i.e. it relates the level of f and
its derivatives.










f(ω) = 0. (23)
The elasticity of substitution θ appears in this equation because it determines how many
workers must exit from depressed markets required to regulate ω above ω. The exogenous
separation rate λ does not appear in this equation because the ratio of endogenous to ex-
ogenous exits is inﬁnite in a short time interval for a market at the lower bound. Since by
deﬁnition there are no markets with smaller ω, f(ω) is not fed from below, which explains














where L0 is the (endogenous) average number of workers in a new labor market. The logic
for the left hand side of this equation parallels the logic behind equation (23). There is an
extra inﬂow at ¯ ω coming from newly-formed markets, which absorb δL0 workers per unit
of time; dividing by L expresses this inﬂow as a percentage of the workers located in labor
markets.
In a new labor market with productivity x0, equation (14) implies that the number of














where the second equation uses the deﬁnition of X0 in equation (9).
Our last condition relates intermediate and ﬁnal goods output. It is convenient to ﬁrst
deﬁne the productivity of a location x consistent with l workers present in the location, a
log full-employment wage ω, and aggregate output and consumption Y . From equation (14),
this solves






















Using this notation, we can write equation (2) as
Y =





















The second equation follows because Q( ,ξ( ,ω,Y))
θ−1
θ is linear (equation 27). To solve this,
we change the variable of integration from the name of the market j to its log full-employment
wage ω and number of workers l. Let ˜ f(ω,l) be the density of the joint distribution of workers
16in markets (ω,l). Then
Y =














˜ f(ω,l)dl, we can solve the inner integral to obtain
Y =










without characterizing the joint density ˜ f.
To summarize, given the thresholds ω and ¯ ω, an equilibrium is a list {Y,L0,L,f( )}
solving equations (21)–(25) and (28). We have the following result:
Proposition 3. There exists a unique equilibrium. The steady state density of workers
across labor markets is
f(ω) =
 2
i=1 |ηi + θ|eηi(ω−ω)
 2








σ2(θ + η1)(θ + η2)
 





eηi(ˆ ω−ω) − e−θ(ˆ ω−ω)
θ + ηi
+ e








i=1 |θ + ηi|
eηi(¯ ω−ω)−1
ηi
eˆ ω  2
i=1 |θ + ηi|
 
eηi(ˆ ω−ω)−e−θ(ˆ ω−ω)
θ+ηi + eηi(¯ ω−ω) e(¯ ω−ˆ ω)−e−ηi(¯ ω−ˆ ω)
1+ηi
 , (31)
where ˆ ω ≡ max{ω,logbr} and η1 < 0 < η2 solve the characteristic equation λ = −µη + σ2
2 η2.
Proof. We solve the system of equations deﬁning an equilibrium recursively. The second
order diﬀerential equation (22) and the boundary conditions equations (21) and (23) yields
equation (29) using standard calculations.
Using the expression for f we solve equations (24), (25), and (28) for L0, L, and Y . First
17eliminate L0 between equations (24) and (25) and evaluate f(¯ ω) using equation (29) to get
L =
−2δY u′(Y )θ(AX0)θ−1e−θ¯ ω
σ2(θ + η1)(θ + η2)
 




eηi(¯ ω−ω) − 1
ηi
. (32)














i=1 |θ + ηi|e−(¯ ω−ˆ ω)
 
eηi(ˆ ω−ω)−e−θ(ˆ ω−ω)




i=1 |θ + ηi|eηi(¯ ω−ω)−1
ηi
, (33)
where we solve the integral using the expression for f in equation (29). Eliminating L
between these equations and solving for u′(Y ) gives equation (30). Since the left hand side
of this equation is monotone, there exists a unique Y solving this equation. Finally, solve
equation (33) for L to complete the proof.  
4.5 Measurement of Unemployment
Once we have found an equilibrium, we can measure the rest and search unemployment rates.
Recall that Ur is the fraction of household members who are rest-unemployed. If logbr ≤ ω,
this is zero. Otherwise, in a market with ω ∈ [ω, ˆ ω], the rest unemployment rate is 1−eθ(ω−ˆ ω).











η2 − eη1(ˆ ω−ω)−1
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The remaining household members who are in labor markets are employed, E = L − Ur.
Now we turn to the search unemployed. Let Ns be the number of workers among L that
leave their labor market per unit of time, either because conditions are suﬃciently bad or
because their labor market has exogenously shut down. Appendix A.6 takes limits of the




f(ω)L + λL. (35)
The ﬁrst term gives the fraction of workers who leave their labor market to keep ω above
ω. The second term is the fraction of workers who exogenously leave their market. In
18steady state, the fraction of workers who leave labor markets must balance the fraction of
workers who arrive in labor markets. The latter is given by the fraction of workers engaged
in search unemployment Us, times the rate at which they arrive to the labor market α, so
αUs = Ns. Solve equation (35) using equation (29) to obtain an expression for the ratio of
















To have an interior equilibrium we require that Us + Ur + E ≤ 1 so that the labor force is
smaller than the total population.5
We deliberately leave the expressions for unemployment as a function of the thresholds ω,
ˆ ω, and ¯ ω in order disentangle optimization—the choice of thresholds—from the mechanics of
aggregation. This has two advantages. First, we ﬁnd it useful to exploit this dichotomy in our
numerical evaluation of the model in Section 5. Second, the expressions for rest and search
unemployment as a function of the thresholds are identical in other variants of the model,
including the original Lucas and Prescott (1974) model. For example, suppose the curvature
of labor demand comes from diminishing returns at the island level, due to a ﬁxed factor,
rather than imperfect substitutability (see footnote 3). Then the analog of the elasticity of
substitution is the reciprocal of the elasticity of revenue with respect to the ﬁxed factor, while
the expressions for unemployment are otherwise unchanged.
We close this section by noting some homogeneity properties of employment, rest unem-
ployment, search unemployment, and consumption.
Proposition 4. Let br = β¯ br, bs = β¯ bs, bi = β¯ bi for ﬁxed ¯ br, ¯ bs, and ¯ bi. The equilibrium
value of the unemployment rate Us+Ur
Us+Ur+E and the share of rest-unemployed Ur
Ur+Us do not
depend on β, the level of productivity A, the distribution of productivity in new labor
markets F, or the utility function u. The equilibrium value of u′(Y ) is proportional to
β
AX0.
Proof. By inspection, the unemployment rate and share of rest-unemployed are functions
of the diﬀerence in thresholds ¯ ω−ω and ¯ ω−ˆ ω and the parameters α, δ, q, θ, µ (or µx), and σ
(or σx), either directly or indirectly through the roots ηi. From Proposition 1, the thresholds
depend on the same parameters and on the discount rate ρ. This completes the ﬁrst part of
the proof.
5If this condition fails, all household members participate. The equilibrium is equivalent to one with a
higher leisure value of inactivity, the value of bi such that Us+Ur+E = 1. In any case, Proposition 4 implies
that for br, bs, and bi large enough, the equilibrium has Us + Ur + E < 1.
19Next, recall from Proposition 1 that eω and e¯ ω are proportional to β. Then equation (30)
implies u′(Y ) inherits the same proportionality. On the other hand, Proposition 1 implies
AX0 does not aﬀect any of the thresholds and so equation (30) implies u′(Y ) is inversely
proportional to AX0.  
This proposition shows that the unemployment rate and composition of unemployment
is determined by the relative advantage of diﬀerent leisure activities, while output, and
hence consumption and employment, depends on an absolute comparison of leisure versus
market production. Indeed, the ﬁnding that u′(Y ) is proportional to β/AX0 holds in the
frictionless benchmark, where an interior solution for the employment rate requires bi =
u′(Y )w, while the wage is proportional to AX0 (see equation 7). Whether higher productivity
lowers or raises equilibrium employment depends on whether income or substitution eﬀects
dominate in labor supply. With u(Y ) = logY , an increase in productivity raises consumption
proportionately without aﬀecting employment or labor force participation.
4.6 The Limiting Economy
This section discusses an important limit of the model, when the exogenous shut-down rate of
markets δ is zero. We introduced the assumption that intermediate goods markets shut down
for technical reasons, to ensure an invariant distribution of productivity and employment.
Still, with the parameter restriction, µx +(θ−1)σ2
x/2 = 0, discussed previously in Section 3,
the economy is well behaved even when δ limits to zero. It is clear from Proposition 1 that
ω and ¯ ω converge nicely for any value of µx as long as the discount rate ρ is positive. More
problematic is whether aggregate employment, unemployment, and output converge. We
now show that the same parameter restriction yields a well-behaved limit of the frictional
economy.
When µx = −(θ−1)σ2
x/2 and δ → 0, the roots of the characteristic equation in Proposition 3
converge to η1 = −θ and η2 = 2q/θσ2. Substituting into equation (29), we ﬁnd
f(ω) =
η2eη2(ω−ω)
eη2(¯ ω−ω) − 1
.
If q = 0 as well, this simpliﬁes further to f(ω) = 1/(¯ ω − ω), i.e. f is uniform on its support,
while for positive q the density is increasing in ω. We can also conﬁrm from equation (30)




(AX0)θ−1(θ + η2)e−(θ¯ ω−ˆ ω)
eη2(¯ ω−ω) − e−θ(¯ ω−ω)
 
eη2(ˆ ω−ω) − e−θ(ˆ ω−ω)
θ + η2
+ e




20We can similarly compute limits of the key measures of employment and unemployment.
From equation (31), the fraction of household members in labor markets is
L =
Y u′(Y )e−ˆ ω eη2(¯ ω−ω)−1
η2
eη2(ˆ ω−ω)−e−θ(ˆ ω−ω)
θ+η2 + eη2(¯ ω−ω) e(¯ ω−ˆ ω)−e−η2(¯ ω−ˆ ω)
1+η2
.

















1 − e−η2(¯ ω−ω) . (37)
Each of these expressions simpliﬁes further when there are no quits, q = 0 and so η2 → 0.6
But the important point is that, although productivity does not have a well-behaved limiting
distribution when δ converges to 0, aggregate output, employment, and rest and search
unemployment are well-behaved in this limit.
5 Quantitative Evaluation
The goal of this section is to use our model to understand the role of search and rest unem-
ployment in the U.S. economy. We focus on the limit of the economy discussed above, i.e. we
assume that µx = −(θ − 1)σ2
x/2 and that δ → 0. Because we have closed-form expressions
for the unemployment and labor force participation rates, comparative statics are relatively
straightforward. It is also straightforward to see how various parameters aﬀect other vari-
ables of interest, including the stochastic process for wages, measures of job creation and
destruction, and the hazard rate of exiting unemployment.
5.1 No Rest Unemployment
To connect the model to the data, we ﬁnd it useful ﬁrst to examine the reduced-form rela-
tionships in equation (37), without worrying about the determinants of the three thresholds
ω, ˆ ω, and ¯ ω.7 Focus ﬁrst on Us/L and assume there is no rest unemployment, ˆ ω = ω. One
can think of the search unemployment rate as depending on four forces. 1/α is the mean
duration of a spell of search unemployment and so Us/L is decreasing in α. q is the exogenous
quit rate and so Us/L is increasing in q.
¯ ω−ω
σ determines the average time it takes a labor
market to move from the hiring threshold to the ﬁring threshold, and so is related to the
6The order of convergence of δ and q to zero does not aﬀect these results.
7The thresholds are determined by the discount rate ρ and the three leisure values, bi, br, and bs, in
addition to the parameters that directly enter equation (37), θ, σ, q, and α.
21duration of employment. And θσ determines how many workers must exit a labor market
at the lower threshold following a one standard deviation productivity shock, and so is also
important for the duration of employment.
To determine reasonable values for these variables, we map our model to the data. From
1990 to 2006, the unemployment rate in the United States averaged 5.5 percent. The mean
duration of an in-progress unemployment spell was 0.31 years, which is implied by α = 3.2.8
For now, we set q = 0 so as to examine the amount of search unemployment that the model
can generate endogenously.
To pin down the remaining parameters, we need to take a stand on the nature of a labor
market. A labor market has two deﬁning characteristics. First, the goods produced within
a labor market are homogeneous while the goods produced in diﬀerent labor markets are
heterogeneous, as captured by the elasticity of substitution θ. This suggests modeling a
labor market as an industry. Second, workers are free to move within a labor market but
not between labor markets, presumably both because of some speciﬁcity of human capital
and because of geographic mobility costs. To the extent that human capital is occupation,
not industry, speciﬁc (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2007), this suggests that a labor market
may be a cross between an occupation and a geographic location. In the end, our deﬁnition
of a labor market is governed by data availability: we measure a labor market as a ﬁve-digit
NAICS industry. Using international trade data, Broda and Weinstein (2006) report median
estimates of the elasticity of substitution between goods at the ﬁve-digit SITC level of about
2.8 (see their Table IV). We therefore set θ to 3.9
Rather than take a stand on values of σ and ¯ ω − ω directly, we observe that σ is critical
for the volatility and
¯ ω−ω
σ for the autocorrelation of wages at the industry level. That σ
aﬀects the volatility is immediate from equation (15). When
¯ ω−ω
σ is large, wages are nearly
a random walk and so this year’s wage level is very informative about next year’s, i.e. the
autocorrelation of wages is large. For small values of
¯ ω−ω
σ , wages hit the bounds frequently
within a short period of time and so are nearly uncorrelated.10 We measure industry-level
average weekly earnings for 312 ﬁve-digit industries from 1990 to 2006 from the Current
8The empirical duration numbers were constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from the Current
Population Survey and may be obtained from http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Our choice of years is governed
by the availability of industry wage data.
9This elasticity is in line with the one used in much of the literature that quantitatively evaluates the
Lucas and Prescott (1974) model. Recall that the analog of θ in a model with diminishing returns at the
labor market level due to a ﬁxed factor is the reciprocal of the elasticity of revenue with respect to the ﬁxed
factor. If the ﬁxed factor is capital, then a capital share of 1
3 is empirically reasonable. Alvarez and Veracierto
(1999) set the elasticity of ﬁxed factor to 0.36, Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) set it to 0.23, and Kambourov
and Manovskii (2007) set it to 0.32, in line with values of θ between 2.8 and 4.3.
10Ball and Roma (1998) ﬁnd an exact formula for the autocorrelation of annual observations from a reﬂected
Brownian motion without drift and prove it depends only on
¯ ω−ω
σ .
22Employment Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/ces/), all the industries with available data.
We deﬂate the nominal annual average of industry earnings by the nominal annual average of
private sector earnings ¯ wt and take logs to construct ωj,t, log relative average weekly earnings
in industry j and year t.11 We then measure the standard deviation of the growth rate of

































Note that neither of these formulas subtracts industry-speciﬁc means. Consistent with our
model, we assume we know industry-speciﬁc mean log average weekly earnings deﬂated by
private sector earnings: it is equal to zero.
To compare the model with U.S. data, we generate data from a discrete time version of
the model, where a time period is 1 week. Each week, we add a normal innovation to log
wages and adjust employment to keep log wages in the appropriate bounds. At the end of
each year, we average the model-generated data, deﬂate by the theoretical average earnings
¯ w = e
ˆ ω
  ˆ ω
ω
f(ω)dω +




and take logs to construct ωj,t. We repeat for T = 17 years and J = 10,000 industries to
obtain accurate estimates of the two moments SD and AC.
To summarize, we match the empirical search unemployment rate of Us
Us+L = 0.055 and
set α = 3.2, q = 0, and θ = 3. This is consistent with many diﬀerent values of σ and ¯ ω − ω,
each associated with a diﬀerent standard deviation of the growth rate and autocorrelation of
the level of earnings. Figure 1 shows that it is impossible to simultaneously match the two
targets. The empirical average autocorrelation of the level of earnings is more than 0.97. To
match such a high autocorrelation, the model requires a standard deviation of growth rates
about eight times as high as the empirical value of 0.03.12 Intuitively, if the diﬀerence ¯ ω −ω
11Fluctuations in productivity A may cause ﬂuctuations in average earnings. With log utility, such ﬂuc-
tuations cause proportional changes in wages but do not aﬀect the unemployment rate. Deﬂating by ¯ wt
therefore perfectly controls for aggregate ﬂuctuations.
12Other moments contain similar information to the autocorrelation of wages, notably the kurtosis of wage
growth. When
¯ ω−ω




















Figure 1: Variation in search unemployment rate. AC is the autocorrelation of earnings
and SD is the standard deviation of the growth rate of earnings. The solid red line shows
the correlation between wj,t and wj,t−1 and the standard deviation of wj,t − wj,t−1 consistent
with α = 3.2, θ = 3, q = 0, and a 5.5% unemployment rate with no rest unemployment.
The dashed blue line shows the combinations consistent with 2% search unemployment; the
dash-dotted green line shows 1% search unemployment; and the dotted black line shows
0.5% search unemployment. The four larger dots show the empirical averages at the two- to
ﬁve-digit NAICS levels.
is large, wages are nearly a random walk; however, when this diﬀerence is large, the incidence
of unemployment is small because it takes labor markets a long time to move from upper to
the lower threshold.
Looking at more disaggregated data might mitigate but is unlikely to eliminate this
problem. First, the additional dots in Figure 1 shows that at higher levels of industry
aggregation, the autocorrelation in wages is slightly higher and the standard deviation of
wages slightly lower. Although data are not available, it is reasonable to expect similarly
modest changes in the autocorrelation and standard deviation in more disaggregated data.
Second, one can prove that changing the elasticity from θ to θ′ > θ shifts the curve down by a
factor θ′/θ. In other words, raising the elasticity of substitution from θ = 3 to θ′ = 6 implies
that the model-generated value of the standard deviation SD is four times the empirical value
(rather than eight times, as discussed in the previous paragraph) when the model matches
the empirical value of the autocorrelation AC. Broda and Weinstein (2006) ﬁnd that at
the seven digit (TSUSA/HTS) level, the median elasticity of substitution is still below 4, so
is platykurtic. For large
¯ ω−ω
σ , time aggregation leads to a slightly leptokurtic wage growth distribution. For
example, at values of
¯ ω−ω
σ that generate AC = 0.97, the kurtosis of wage growth is about 3.3. In the data,






















Figure 2: Variation in quit rate. AC is the autocorrelation of earnings and SD is the standard
deviation of the growth rate of earnings. The solid red line shows the correlation between
wj,t and wj,t−1 and the standard deviation of wj,t − wj,t−1 consistent with α = 3.2, θ = 3,
q = 0, and a 5.5% unemployment rate with no rest unemployment. The dashed blue line
shows the combinations consistent with q = 0.06; the dash-dotted green line shows q = 0.12;
and the dotted black line shows q = 0.18 search unemployment. The four larger dots show
the empirical averages at the two- to ﬁve-digit NAICS levels.
we view the values of the elasticity needed to bring the model in line with the data to be
empirical implausible at any level of disaggregation. Alternatively, we can reduce the amount
of search unemployment that we ask the model to generate. This alone does not seem to
be a promising resolution: the remaining three lines in Figure 1 show that even reducing
the search unemployment rate to 0.5% reduces but does not eliminate the gap between the
model and data.
Allowing for exogenous quits also improves the ﬁt of the model to data, but again only
marginally. Keep the same values of the other parameters as in the baseline, α = 3.2, θ = 3,
and a 5.5% search unemployment rate. Figure 2 shows that by raising the exogenous quit
rate to 0.18, we again close part of the gap between model and data. However, with these
parameters, exogenous quits account for 98 percent of all unemployment. In any case, we ﬁnd
a model where exogenous parameters govern both unemployment incidence (q) and duration
(α) to be uninteresting.
5.2 Reintroducing Rest Unemployment
Reintroducing rest unemployment improves the model’s ﬁt for several reasons: it creates
another source of unemployment; it reduces the standard deviation of wages by creating an
25interval [ω, ˆ ω] where wages are constant from year-to-year; and it raises the autocorrelation
of wages because of the persistence generated by labor markets that spend time in this
interval. The last two forces imply that the presence of rest unemployment may permit
more search unemployment without generating unrealistically low autocorrelations or high
standard deviations of growth rates of average weekly earnings.
To be concrete, again set α = 3.2, θ = 3, and q = 0, and choose σ, ¯ ω − ω, and ˆ ω − ω
to generate a 1.3 percent search unemployment rate and 4.2 percent rest unemployment
rate. This breakdown between search and rest unemployment is consistent with evidence
in Murphy and Topel (1987) from the March Current Population Survey and in Loungani
and Rogerson (1989) from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The two papers
classify switchers and stayers in a similar way, based on whether the workers switched two-
digit industry, and ﬁnd that workers who switch two-digit industries account for about a
quarter of all unemployment spells, while stayers account for the remaining three-quarters.
According to our model, all stayers experienced a spell of rest unemployment, while switchers’
unemployment spell ended in search.13
The solid red line in Figure 3—which has a more compressed scale than the preceding
ﬁgures—shows that higher values of σ allow for a higher autocorrelation AC without sub-
stantially increasing the standard deviation SD; indeed, in the limit, increases in σ raise the
fraction of industries with rest unemployment by enough to drive AC to 1 and SD to 0.
Although a gap between model and data remains, the ﬁgure shows that this can be reduced
by introducing exogenous quits. Still ﬁxing α = 3.2 and θ = 3, let q = 0.04, σ = 0.12,
¯ ω − ω = 1.61, and ˆ ω − ω = 0.55. This generates the target search and rest unemployment
rates and matches the autocorrelation of wages (AC) at the industry level.14 The standard
deviation of wage growth (SD) is still higher in the model (0.046) than the data (0.031 at
the ﬁve-digit level), as can be seen in Figure 3. We can close this gap either by a moderate
increase in the elasticity of substitution, to approximately θ = 4.5, or by a further reduction
in the target for the search unemployment rate matched by an increase in the target for the
rest unemployment rate.
13In the model without rest unemployment, we chose α to match the mean duration of unemployment.
In Section 5.4, we compute the mean duration of unemployment in the full model and show that it is no
longer equal to 1/α. Still, we keep α ﬁxed at 3.2 for two reasons: it simpliﬁes the comparison of the models
with and without rest unemployment; and Loungani and Rogerson (1989) ﬁnd that switchers account for
about a a quarter of all unemployment spells and a third of all weeks of unemployment, which implies that
the duration of unemployment spell for a switcher is only slightly longer than for the average unemployment
spell.
14The kurtosis of wage growth is 3.4, slightly higher than the values with only search unemployment and
the same AC (see footnote 12). Rest unemployment raises the kurtosis by eﬀectively creating two sets
of industries, some with instantaneous standard deviation of wage growth σ and some—those with rest



















Figure 3: Variation in quit rate with rest unemployment. AC is the autocorrelation of
earnings and SD is the standard deviation of the growth rate of earnings. The solid red
line shows the correlation between wj,t and wj,t−1 and the standard deviation of wj,t −wj,t−1
consistent with α = 3.2, θ = 3, q = 0, a 1.3% search unemployment rate, and a 4.2% rest
unemployment rate. The dashed blue line shows the combinations consistent with q = 0.02;
and the dash-dotted green line shows q = 0.04. The four larger dots show the empirical
averages at the two- to ﬁve-digit NAICS levels.
We can back out the structural parameters consistent with this search and rest unemploy-
ment rate. To be consistent with balanced growth, we assume u( ) = log( ). Still thinking
of a unit of a time as a year, we set ρ = 0.05. From Proposition 4, the search and rest
unemployment rates, Ur
Us+L = 0.042 and Us
Us+L = 0.013, then depend only on ratios of the
three leisure values, which pins down br/bi = 0.97 and κ ≡
bi−bs
αbi = 12.3.
These numbers reveal two regularities. First, in order to generate rest unemployment,
br/bi must be close to 1. Given all the other structural parameters, we require br/bi > 0.76
to have any rest unemployment (see Proposition 2). This suggests that, while the rest
unemployed must pay some cost to remain in contact with their labor market, the cost
is small. Put diﬀerently, rest unemployment and inactivity may look quite similar to an
outsider who observes individuals’ time use, even though the rest unemployed may be much
more likely to return to work.
Second, to generate a strong autocorrelation in wages, we need the search cost κ to be
large, here equivalent to 12.3 years of inactivity.15 Indeed since κ > 1/α, the leisure value of
15This is mainly due to the high autocorrelation in wages, not rest unemployment. If we calibrate the
model to match a 5.5% search unemployment rate with no rest unemployment, θ = 3, α = 3.2, no exogenous
quits, and AC = 0.97 (so σ = 0.55, ¯ ω − ω = 2.44, and SD = 0.24), the required search cost is κ = 9.4.
Calibrating the model with exogenous quits, it is higher still.
27rest unemployment must actually be negative. A strong autocorrelation in wages requires a
large region of inaction ¯ ω − ω, but this implies that the wage in the most productive labor
markets is much higher than the wage in less productive markets. In order for workers to be
willing to endure such an unproductive market, the cost of moving must be large. This is
essentially the contrapositive of Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante’s (2006) ﬁnding that when
search costs are small, search models cannot generate much wage dispersion. Introducing
other mobility costs, such as market-speciﬁc human capital, may alleviate this issue.
5.3 Job Creation and Destruction
We can use the model to measure gross job creation and job destruction rate at the industry
level. Following Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh’s (1996) analysis of ﬁrms, we deﬁne the
number of jobs destroyed in a labor market between t0 and t1 as the decrease in the number
of employed workers in that labor market between those dates, or zero if the number of
employed workers increased. Job creation is deﬁned symmetrically. The gross job destruction
(creation) rate is then deﬁned as the total number of jobs destroyed (created) across all labor
markets divided by employment E.
The job creation and destruction rates are easily computed numerically. Consider a
labor market that has a log full-employment wage ω at t0. Using Monte Carlo, we ﬁnd
the job creation and destruction rates at t1; these rates depend on ω but are independent
of the number of workers in the market. We then take a weighted average of job creation
and destruction rates, weighting by the fraction of employed workers at each value of ω,
eθmin{ω−ˆ ω,0}f(ω), where eθmin{ω−ˆ ω,0} accounts for rest unemployment in markets with ω < ˆ ω.
When there is no rest unemployment, jobs are destroyed only to keep ω regulated above ω.
The instantaneous job destruction rate is then given by Ns in equation (35). Moreover, once
a job is destroyed, it is only recreated if the market experiences a series of shocks that brings
ω back to ¯ ω. Over annual frequencies, this probability is negligible if
¯ ω−ω
σ is large enough
to give a plausible autocorrelation of earnings. Thus we would expect the job destruction
rate over a time horizon t to be roughly equal to Nst. Unreported simulations support this
intuition.
In the full model, jobs are also destroyed when workers become rest unemployed, which
is easily reversed. This makes the job destruction rate a concave function of the amount of
elapsed time. The red line shows job destruction (and job creation) in the calibrated model
with search and rest unemployment; the concavity is clearly visible.
We can compare this ﬁnding with data on job creation and job destruction at the industry
level. We use the Current Employment Statistics measure of monthly employment for 387

































































b b b b b b
Job Creation
Job Destruction
Figure 4: The solid red line shows the job creation and destruction rate from the model.
The parameter values are in the text. The dots show show job creation and destruction for
ﬁve-digit industries at diﬀerent frequencies.
seasonal factors.16 Figure 4 shows a clear concave pattern in these measures as well. In the
data, the ratio of job destruction at annual and quarterly frequencies is 2.1. For job creation,
the ratio is somewhat higher, 2.9. According to the calibrated model, the ratio of job creation
or destruction at annual and quarterly frequencies should be 3.2.
It is worth noting that the model signiﬁcantly overstates the incidence of job creation
and destruction at the industry level. It is unclear how to reconcile model and data along
this dimension. For example, reducing the elasticity of substitution to θ = 2 reduces the
annual creation and destruction rates only marginally below 4 percent. One possibility is
lowering the target for search unemployment and raising the target for rest unemployment,
keeping the total unemployment rate constant. Since rest unemployment is rapidly reversed,
it contributes to unemployment incidence but has little eﬀect on longer-term measures of
creation and destruction. For example, set the target for the search unemployment rate to
0.7 percent and for the rest unemployment rate to 4.8 percent. Also reduce the quit rate
to q = 0.02, since higher values are inconsistent with such a low search unemployment rate.
Then the annual job creation and destruction rates are about 2.6 percent, with little eﬀect
on the curvature in Figure 4.
16The data show net employment growth, which is easily introduced to the model by making households
increase in size over time. We ﬁnd the existence of signiﬁcant seasonal factors intriguing. It would be hard to
get workers moving in and out of the labor force seasonally when doing so entails time-consuming search. It
is easier instead to move between employment and rest unemployment. Incorporating seasonal ﬂuctuations
in the value of leisure into the model goes beyond the scope of this paper.
29The ﬁnding that job creation and destruction increase less than linearly with time is
consistent with other datasets. Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) report a quarterly job
destruction rate for manufacturing establishments of 5.5% and an annual destruction rate
of 10.3%.17 Using the same data set, Schuh and Triest (2000) report 27.4% job destruction
at a ﬁve year horizon. Faberman (2003) studies all private sector establishments in 53
Metropolitan Statistical Areas in ﬁve states. He reports 6.7% job destruction at quarterly
frequencies and 11.4% at annual frequencies. Using microdata from the Job Openings and
Labor Turnover Survey, Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006) report a monthly job
destruction rate of 1.5% and quarterly job destruction rate of 3.1%. From the Business
Employment Dynamics survey of all private establishments, they report 7.6% quarterly job
destruction and 13.7% annual. Each of these papers ﬁnds similar curvature for job creation.
The strong reversibility of job creation and job destruction, consistent with ﬁrms having easy
access to a pool of rest-unemployed workers, appears to be a robust empirical fact.
5.4 Hazard Rate of Exiting Unemployment
When there is no rest unemployment, the hazard of exiting unemployment is simply α. This
section characterizes the hazard of exiting unemployment when there is rest unemployment,
ˆ ω > ω. A worker who just switched between employment and rest unemployment is at
the margin between the two states. A small shock will move him back. But the longer
a worker remains unemployed, the more likely her labor market has suﬀered a series of
adverse shocks, reducing the hazard of ﬁnding a job. The low hazard rate of exiting long-
term unemployment may be important for understanding the coexistence of many workers
who move easily between jobs and a relatively small number of workers who suﬀer extended
unemployment spells (Juhn, Murphy, and Topel, 1991).
Observe that our model determines the number of workers who are employed and rest
unemployed in each labor market j and the number of workers who are in search unemploy-
ment. It does not determine which of the workers in a labor market with rest unemployment
is employed, nor who exits a market when ω hits ω, nor which workers are in search un-
employment rather than inactivity. To discuss labor market ﬂows, we need to determine
these.
First, we impose that some workers are permanently inactive. This means that workers
who leave their labor market become search unemployed. This can be interpreted as the
outcome of heterogeneity in preference for leisure, in which case our analysis considers the
17Our model is inconsistent with annual job destruction less than half as big as quarterly job destruction.
There is a signiﬁcant seasonal component in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh’s (1996) data which may explain
this ﬁnding.
30limit as the heterogeneity vanishes.
To determine who works and who is unemployed, we suppose there is a small amount of
industry-speciﬁc learning-by-doing. Then the least-skilled worker—the one with the shortest
tenure in the industry—will always be the ﬁrst to enter rest unemployment and the ﬁrst
to exit the labor market. Again, our analysis corresponds to the limit as learning-by-doing
vanishes. The important implication of this assumption is that the hazard rate of exiting
unemployment conditional on unemployment duration is the same for all workers.
Let H(t,∆) be the probability that a worker who has had a (rest or search) unemployment
spell of duration t will transit from unemployment to employment at least once in the next ∆
units of time and let h(t) = lim∆→0 H(t,∆)/∆ be the associated hazard rate. Given values
for the thresholds ω, ˆ ω, and ¯ ω, we can compute the hazard rate h(t) as the weighted average
of two hazard rates:








ur(t)+us(t) is the probability that a worker with unemployment duration t is rest-
unemployed. For a search-unemployed worker, spells end at rate α, independent of the
duration of the spell. For a rest-unemployed worker, her spell ends when local labor market
conditions improve enough for her to reenter employment. We let ˆ hr(t) denote that hazard
rate of this event. It is also useful to let hr(t) denote the hazard of endogenously exiting rest
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These sums are easily calculated numerically.
We then compute the duration-contingent unemployment rates by solving a system of
two ordinary diﬀerential equations with time-varying coeﬃcients:
˙ ur(t) = −ur(t)(δ + q + hr(t) + ˆ hr(t)) and ˙ us(t) = −us(t)α + ur(t)(δ + q + hr(t)) (39)
for all t > 0. The number of workers in rest unemployment falls as markets shut down and
workers exogenously quit, as they exit the market for search unemployment, and as they
31reenter employment. In the ﬁrst three events, they become search unemployed, while search
unemployment falls at rate α as these workers ﬁnd jobs. To solve these diﬀerential equations,
we require two boundary conditions; however, to compute the share of rest unemployed in the
unemployed population with duration t,
ur(t)









where Ur and Us are given in equations (34) and (36).
The hazard rate is particularly easy to characterize both at short and long durations.
When t is small, we ﬁnd that ˆ hr(t) ≈ 1
2t. Intuitively, consider a market with ω = ˆ ω. After a
short time interval—short enough that the variance of the Brownian motion dominates the
drift—there is a
1
2 probability that ω has increased, so the worker is reemployed, and a
1
2
chance it has fallen. But a one-half probability over any horizon t implies a hazard rate 1/2t.







































while otherwise the limiting ratio is zero. Together this implies limt→∞ h(t) = min{α,ψ1 +
δ + q}, a function only of the slower exit rate. In our baseline calibration, α = 3.2, δ = 0,
q = 0.04, and ψ1 = 0.24, so the exit rate from long-term unemployment is governed by
the behavior of the rest unemployed. The eﬃciency of search aﬀects the hazard of exiting
long-term unemployment only indirectly, through its inﬂuence on the distance between the
rest unemployment boundaries ˆ ω − ¯ ω.
Figure 5 shows the annual hazard rate of ﬁnding a job in our baseline calibration, including
a 4.2 percent rest unemployment rate and 1.3 percent search unemployment rate. The overall
hazard rate roughly mimics the behavior of ˆ hr(t), especially at short unemployment durations,
when most unemployed workers are in rest unemployment. Since the rest unemployed ﬁnd
jobs so quickly at the start of an unemployment spell, the share of searchers among the
unemployed grows rapidly (Figure 6), peaking at about 54 percent of unemployment after
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Figure 5: Hazard rate of ﬁnding a job as a function of unemployment duration. The param-
eter values are in the text.
falls below the hazard of exiting search unemployment and so the share of searchers starts
to decline, asymptoting to just 4 percent of unemployment at very long durations.
Our ﬁnding of a constant hazard rate for workers in search unemployment and a decreasing
hazard rate for workers in rest unemployment is qualitatively consistent with Katz and Meyer
(1990) and Starr-McCluer (1993). Katz and Meyer (1990) show that the empirical decline in
the job ﬁnding hazard rate is concentrated among workers on temporary layoﬀ. Moreover,
they ﬁnd that workers who expect to be recalled to a past employer and are not—in the
parlance of our model, workers who end a spell of rest unemployment by searching for a
new labor market, at hazard hr(t) + δ + q—experience longer unemployment duration than
observationally equivalent workers who immediately entered search unemployment. In our
model, this last group would correspond to workers experiencing a δ or q shock. Starr-
McCluer (1993) ﬁnds that the hazard of exiting unemployment is decreasing for workers who
move to a job that is similar to their previous one (rest unemployed) while it is actually
increasing for workers who move to a diﬀerent type of job (search unemployed).
In contrast to Murphy and Topel (1987) and Loungani and Rogerson (1989), Starr-
McCluer (1993) ﬁnds relatively few stayers and ﬁnds that stayers experience relatively short
unemployment spells. The behavior of hazard rates in our model can reconcile these ﬁndings.
To understand why, note that in Starr-McCluer’s (1993) data, many unemployment spells
are censored. She ﬁnds that stayers account for half of all unemployment spells but a quarter
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Figure 6: Fraction of searchers among the unemployed by duration,
us(t)
ur(t)+us(t). The parameter
values are in the text.
and a quarter of all weeks of unemployment, and censored observations account for a quarter
of all unemployment spells and and a half of all weeks of unemployment. That is, stayers
ﬁnd jobs quickly while censored observations have the longest unemployment spells. Because
of the relative duration of stayers’ and switchers’ spells, she guesses that most of the cen-
sored observations would ultimately be classiﬁed as switchers if the data were available. Our
model’s declining hazard rate for the rest-unemployed instead suggests that many of them
would ultimately be classiﬁed as stayers. Using the classiﬁcation suggested by our model,
Starr-McCluer’s (1993) data imply a breakdown between stayers and switchers and a pattern
for their unemployment duration consistent with Loungani and Rogerson (1989).
Finally, in the baseline calibration of our model, the mean duration of an in progress
unemployment spell is 2.5 years while the median duration is 1.1 years. Both of these
numbers are far larger than in the data, reﬂecting infrequent episodes of very long term
unemployment. Unfortunately, we believe it is not possible to parameterize the model to
match simultaneously the level of unemployment, the division between search and rest, the
behavior of wages, and the mean duration of unemployment.
6 Discussion
We ﬁnish by answering the two questions posed in the introduction: Can we distinguish
between economies with diﬀerent amounts of search and rest unemployment? And is the
34life of a worker in search unemployment substantially diﬀerent from that of one in rest
unemployment?
Our analysis in Section 5 provides a partial answer to the ﬁrst question. Rest unemploy-
ment helps explain why wages are so persistent yet some workers cycle frequently between
jobs. It helps explain why job creation and destruction are such concave functions of elapsed
time. And it helps explain why the hazard of exiting unemployment declines with unem-
ployment duration, leading to the coexistence of a large number of very short unemployment
spells with a small number of workers who stay unemployed for years. In each case, this is a
consequence of workers’ ability to cycle costlessly between rest unemployment and work.
To answer the second question, we talk with a worker in rest unemployment. She might
tell us that she routinely moves in and out of jobs, and perhaps is classiﬁed as working part
time.18 When we ask her why she does not search for a job in a diﬀerent industry, she
explains all the costs of doing so, including gathering the necessary information, retraining,
and moving to a new city. Things really are not that bad and might get a lot better.
When we catch up with our worker a year later, she tells us that she has not worked since
we last met. Again we ask her why she doesn’t look for a better job. She tells us that she
is thinking about moving, but in fact many of her former coworkers have already left town.
If labor market conditions should improve, she could easily ﬁnd a job paying a high wage.
We ask her, with the beneﬁt of hindsight, if she should have looked for a new job after our
previous conversation. She says of course, but stresses that there is no way she could have
known how badly things would turn out. When we try to ﬁnd her after another year has
passed, her neighbor tells us she has left town and is now working at a higher wage in a new
job. In the end, he says, it took her less than four months to ﬁnd the new job.
18From 1994 to 2007, the U.S. unemployment rate averaged 5.1 percent. Including discour-
aged workers and other marginally attached workers raises this to 6.1 percent, while also adding
those who work “part time for economic reasons” raises the average to 8.9 percent. See
http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab12.htm.
35A Appendix
A.1 Density of Productivity x
Consider a labor market with initial productivity x0. Let fx(˜ x;x0) denote the steady state
density of log productivity, ˜ x ≡ logx, across all such labor markets. This solves a Kolmogorov
forward equation:















1(x0)e˜ η1˜ x + D1
2(x0)e˜ η2˜ x if ˜ x < logx0
D2
1(x0)e˜ η1˜ x + D2
2(x0)e˜ η2˜ x if ˜ x > logx0,
where ˜ η1 < 0 < ˜ η2 are the two real roots of the characteristic equation






For this to be a well-deﬁned density, integrating to 1 on (−∞,∞), we require that D1
1(x0) =
D2
2(x0) = 0. To pin down the remaining constants, we use two more conditions: the density is






˜ η1−˜ η2e˜ η2(˜ x−logx0) if ˜ x < logx0
˜ η1˜ η2
˜ η1−˜ η2e˜ η1(˜ x−logx0) if ˜ x > logx0.
(42)
With this notation, we can rewrite equation (6) as
w = A









The interior integral converges if ˜ η1 + θ − 1 < 0 < ˜ η2 + θ − 1. The deﬁnition of ˜ ηi in
equation (41) implies these inequalities are equivalent to condition (8). With this restriction,
equation (43) reduces to equation (7).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
36Stokey (2006) proves in Proposition 10.4 that for all ω0 ∈ [ω, ¯ ω],
Πω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) =

     
     
 
ζ2eζ1ω0+ζ2¯ ω − ζ1eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ζ2ω0  
ζ2eζ2(ω−ω) − ζ1eζ1(ω−ω) 
(ρ + λ)(ζ2 − ζ1)
 
eζ1ω+ζ2¯ ω − eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ω  if ω ≤ ω < ω0
 
ζ2eζ1ω0+ζ2ω − ζ1eζ1ω+ζ2ω0  
ζ2eζ2(¯ ω−ω) − ζ1eζ1(¯ ω−ω) 
(ρ + λ)(ζ2 − ζ1)
 
eζ1ω+ζ2¯ ω − eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ω  if ω0 ≤ ω ≤ ¯ ω,
(44)
where ζ1 < 0 < ζ2 are the two roots of the characteristic equation





For ω0 < ω, Πω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) = Πω(ω;ω;ω, ¯ ω) and for ω0 > ¯ ω, Πω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) = Πω(ω; ¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω).
That v is continuous follows immediately from equations (18) and (44). In particular, the
latter equation deﬁnes Πω as a continuous function.
We next prove that the distribution Π( ;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) is increasing in each of ω0, ω, and ¯ ω in
the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. This follows from diﬀerentiating equation (44)
with respect to each variable and using simple algebra. One can verify that an increase
in ω strictly increases Πω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) for all ω ∈ (ω, ¯ ω). This therefore strictly reduces
Π(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) for ω ∈ (ω, ¯ ω). Similarly, an increase in ¯ ω strictly reduces Πω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) for
all ω ∈ (ω, ¯ ω), which also strictly reduces Π(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) for ω ∈ (ω, ¯ ω). Finally, an increase
in ω0 when ω0 ∈ (ω, ¯ ω) reduces Πω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) for ω ∈ (ω,ω0) and raises it for ω ∈ (ω0, ¯ ω).
Once again, this implies a stochastic dominating shift in Π.
Since the return function max{br,eω} + λv is nondecreasing in ω, weak monotonicity of
v in each argument follows immediately from equation (18). In addition, the return function
is strictly increasing when ω > logbr, and so we obtain strict monotonicity when the support
of the integral includes some ω > logbr, i.e. when ¯ ω > logbr.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We start by proving the result when br < bi and defer br ≥ bi until the end.
First, deﬁne ¯ ω∗ to solve v(¯ ω∗; ¯ ω∗, ¯ ω∗) = ¯ v. When ω is regulated at the point ¯ ω∗, it is





This point is depicted along the 45◦ line in Figure 7. Lemma 1 ensures v is continuous




¯ ω = ω
¯ ω∗ ω∗
¯ ω∗∗
¯ ω = ¯ Ω(ω)
ω = Ω(¯ ω)
Figure 7: Illustration of the proof of Proposition 1 when br < bi.
make v(¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω) unboundedly large by increasing ¯ ω, while we can make it smaller than ¯ v
by setting ¯ ω = ¯ ω∗. Then by the intermediate value theorem, for any ω < ¯ ω∗, there exists
a ¯ Ω(ω) > ¯ ω∗ solving v(¯ Ω(ω);ω, ¯ Ω(ω)) ≡ ¯ v. Continuity of v ensures ¯ Ω is continuous while
monotonicity of v ensures it is decreasing. In addition, because the period return function
s(ω) ≡ max{br,eω} + λv is bounded below but not above, ¯ ω∗∗ ≡ limω→−∞ ¯ Ω(ω) is ﬁnite.
Thus ¯ Ω(ω) ∈ (¯ ω∗, ¯ ω∗∗) for any ω < ¯ ω∗. Figure 7 illustrates this function.





Since v < ¯ v, ω∗ < ¯ ω∗, while equation (10) implies ω∗ = logbi. For any ¯ ω > ω∗, we can make
v(ω;ω, ¯ ω) approach
ρbr+λbi
ρ(ρ+λ) < v by making ω arbitrarily small, while we can make it bigger
than v by setting ω = ω∗. Then by the intermediate value theorem, for any ¯ ω > ω∗, there
exists a Ω(¯ ω) < ω∗ solving v(Ω(¯ ω);Ω(¯ ω), ¯ ω) ≡ v. Continuity of v ensures Ω is continuous
while monotonicity of v ensures it is decreasing. Thus Ω(¯ ω) < ω∗ for any ¯ ω > ω∗.
An equilibrium is simply a ﬁxed point ¯ ω of the composition of the functions ¯ Ω ◦ Ω. The
preceding argument implies that this composition maps [¯ ω∗, ¯ ω∗∗] into itself and is continuous,
and hence has a ﬁxed point.
To prove the uniqueness of the ﬁxed point when br < bi, we prove that the composition
of the two functions has a slope less than 1, i.e. ¯ Ω′(Ω(¯ ω))Ω′(¯ ω) < 1. To start, simple
transformations of equation (44) imply that the cross partial derivatives of the discounted
38occupancy function satisfy
Πω0,¯ ω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) =
ζ1ζ2e(ζ1+ζ2)¯ ω  
e−ζ1(ω−ω) − e−ζ2(ω−ω)  
eζ1ω+ζ2ω0 − eζ1ω0+ζ2ω 
(eζ1ω+ζ2¯ ω − eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ω)
2 (ρ + λ)
< 0
Πω0,ω(ω;ω0;ω, ¯ ω) =
−ζ1ζ2e(ζ1+ζ2)ω  
eζ2(¯ ω−ω) − eζ1(¯ ω−ω)  
eζ1ω0+ζ2¯ ω − eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ω0 
(eζ1ω+ζ2¯ ω − eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ω)
2 (ρ + λ)
> 0,
where the inequalities use the fact that all the terms in parenthesis are positive. Then use
integration-by-parts on equation (18) to write








where the period return function s(ω) is nondecreasing and strictly increasing for ω > logbr,
and Π is the discounted occupancy function. Taking the cross partial derivatives of this
expression gives vω0,¯ ω(ω0;ω, ¯ ω) > 0 > vω0,ω(ω0;ω, ¯ ω). In particular,
v¯ ω(¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω) > v¯ ω(ω;ω, ¯ ω) and vω(ω;ω, ¯ ω) > vω(¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω).
Now since vω0(ω0;ω, ¯ ω) > 0 from Lemma 1, these inequalities imply
vω(¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω)
vω0(¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω) + v¯ ω(¯ ω;ω, ¯ ω)
v¯ ω(ω;ω, ¯ ω)
vω0(ω;ω, ¯ ω) + vω(ω;ω, ¯ ω)
< 1.
In particular, this is true when evaluated at any point {ω, ¯ ω} where ¯ ω = ¯ Ω(ω) and ω = Ω(¯ ω).
Implicit diﬀerentiation of the deﬁnitions of these functions shows that the ﬁrst term in the
above inequality is −¯ Ω′(ω) and the second term is −Ω′(¯ ω), which proves ¯ Ω′(Ω(¯ ω))Ω′(¯ ω) < 1.
Next we prove proportionality of the thresholds e¯ ω and eω to the leisure values br, bi,
and bs. From equations (10) and (11), v and ¯ v are homogeneous of degree one in the three
leisure values. The function max{br,eω} + λv is also homogeneous of degree 1 in the leisure
values and eω. By inspection of equation (44), Πω is unaﬀected by an equal absolute increase
in each of its arguments. Then the integral in equation (18) is homogeneous of degree one in
the b’s and e¯ ω and eω. The result follows from equation (17).
Finally we consider br ≥ bi, so the period return function s(ω) ≥ bi + λv for all ω. This
implies v(ω;−∞, ¯ ω) ≥ v for all ω and ¯ ω. Then an equilibrium is deﬁned by v(¯ ω;−∞, ¯ ω) = ¯ v.
As discussed above, the solution of this equation is ¯ ω∗∗ ∈ (¯ ω∗,∞).
39A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
First, set br = 0. By Proposition 1, there exists a unique equilibrium characterized by
thresholds ω0 and ¯ ω0. We now prove that ¯ br ≡ eω0. To see why, observe that for all
br ≤ ¯ br, the equations characterizing equilibrium are unchanged from the case of br = 0
because logbr ≤ ω0, and hence the equilibrium is unchanged. Conversely, for all br > ¯ br, the
equations characterizing equilibrium necessarily are changed, and so the equilibrium must
have logbr > ωbr.
Next we prove that ¯ br/bi = B(κ,ρ + λ,µ,σ). Again with br = 0, combine equations (17)
and (18), noting the discounted local time function Πω integrates to
1
ρ+λ, and use the deﬁni-
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  ¯ ω0
ω0
e
ωΠω(ω; ¯ ω0;ω0, ¯ ω0)dω.
Since Πω is homogeneous of degree zero in the exponentials of its arguments (see equation 44),
this implies eω0 and e¯ ω0 are homogeneous of degree 1 in bi. Moreover, ζi depends on ρ +
λ, µ, and σ by equation (45) and so the density Πω in equation (44) depends on these
same parameters. It follows that the solution to these equations can depend only on these
parameters and the parameters on the left hand side of the above equations. In particular,
this proves
e
ω0 = biB(κ,ρ + λ,µ,σ).
Since ¯ br = eω0, that establishes the dependence of ¯ br on this limited set of parameters.
Obviously B is positive-valued. By Proposition 1, ω0 < logbi and so B < 1. We ﬁnally
prove it is decreasing in κ. Since κ aﬀects ω and ¯ ω only through ¯ v, to establish that B is
decreasing in κ it suﬃces to show that the ω and ¯ ω that solve equations (17) and (18) is
decreasing in ¯ v. This follows because ¯ Ω(ω) is increasing in ¯ v and Ω(¯ ω) is unaﬀected, where
these functions are deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 1. A decrease in ¯ v then reduces the
composition ¯ Ω ◦ Ω. Since the slope of this function is less than 1, it reduces the location of
the ﬁxed point ¯ ω and hence raises ω = Ω(¯ ω).
A.5 Derivation of the Density f
We use a discrete time, discrete state space model to obtain the Kolmogorov forward equa-
tions and boundary conditions for the density f. Divide [ω, ¯ ω] into n intervals of length
∆ω = (¯ ω − ω)/n. Let the time period be ∆t = (∆ω/σ)2 and assume that when ω < ¯ ω, it
40decreases with probability 1
2(1 + ∆p) where ∆p = µ∆ω/σ2; when ω > ω, it increases with
probability
1
2(1 − ∆p); and otherwise ω stays constant. Note that for ω < ω(t) < ¯ ω, the
expected value of ω(t + ∆t) − ω(t) is µ∆t and the second moment is σ2∆t. As n goes to
inﬁnity, this converges to a regulated Brownian motion with drift µ and standard deviation σ.
Now let fn(ω,t) denote the fraction of workers in markets with log full employment
wage ω at time t for ﬁxed n. With a slight abuse of notation, let fn(ω) be the stationary
distribution. We are interested in characterizing the density f(ω) = limn→∞
fn(ω)
∆ω . For
ω ∈ [ω + ∆ω, ¯ ω − ∆ω], the dynamics of ω imply
fn(ω,t + ∆t) = (1 − λ∆t)
 
1
2(1 + ∆p)fn(ω − ∆ω,t) + 1
2(1 − ∆p)fn(ω + ∆ω,t)
 
. (46)
In any period of length ∆t, a fraction λ∆t of workers leave due to market shut downs and
idiosyncratic quits. Thus the workers in markets with ω at t + ∆t are a fraction 1 − λ∆t
of those who were in markets at ω − ∆ω at t and had a positive shock, plus the same
fraction of those who were in markets at ω+∆ω at t and had a negative shock. Now impose
stationarity on fn. Take a second order approximation to fn(ω+∆ω) and fn(ω−∆ω) around

































Taking the limit as n converges to inﬁnity,
fn(ω)
∆ω → f(ω) solving equation (22).
Now consider the behavior of fn at the lower threshold ω. A similar logic implies
fn(ω,t + ∆t) = (1 − λ∆t)1
2(1 − ∆p)
 
fn(ω + ∆ω,t) + fn(ω,t)(1 − ∆˜ l)
 
.
The workers at ω at t+∆t either were at ω+∆ω or at ω at t; in both cases, they had a negative
shock. Moreover, in the latter case, a fraction ∆˜ l ≡ θ∆ω of the workers exited the market
to keep ω above ω. Again impose stationarity but now take a ﬁrst order approximation to
fn(ω + ∆ω) at ω; the higher order terms will drop out later in any case. Replacing ∆t, ∆p,




























Now consider the behavior of fn at the upper threshold ¯ ω:




fn(¯ ω − ∆ω,t) + fn(¯ ω,t)(1 + ∆˜ l)
 
+ δ∆tL0/L.
Compared to the equation at the lower threshold, the only signiﬁcant change is the last term,
which reﬂects the fact that on average a fraction L0/L workers enter at the upper threshold
when a new market is created. Recall also that markets are destroyed at rate δ per unit
of time and hence δ∆tL0/L is the fraction of workers added to the upper threshold due to



























Eliminate terms in fn(¯ ω) and take the limit as n → ∞ to obtain
fn(¯ ω)
∆ω → f(¯ ω) solving
equation (24).
A.6 Exit Rates from Labor Markets
A worker exits her labor market if the log full-employment wage is ω and the market is hit
by an adverse shock, if the labor market closes, or if she quits. In the discrete time, discrete
state space model, the ﬁrst event hits a fraction
1
2∆˜ l(1 − ∆p) of the workers who survive in
a labor market with ω = ω:
Ns∆t ≡ (1 − λ∆t)1
2(1 − ∆p)∆˜ lfn(ω)L + λ∆tL
Reexpress ∆ω, ∆˜ l, and ∆p in terms of ∆t, take the limit as n → ∞, and use
fn(ω)
∆ω → f(ω),
to get equation (35).
A.7 Hazard Rates
Consider a Brownian motion with initial ω ∈ (ω, ˆ ω). Let ˆ G(t; ; ) and G(t; ; ) denote the
cumulative distribution function for the times until each of the barriers is hit, conditional on
the initial value of ω:
ˆ G(t; ˆ ω,ω;ω) = Pr{t ≤ Tˆ ω,Tˆ ω < Tω |ω(0) = ω}
G(t; ˆ ω,ω;ω) = Pr{t ≤ Tω,Tω < Tˆ ω |ω(0) = ω},
42with associated densities ˆ g and g. Kolkiewicz (2002, pp. 17–18) proves
ˆ g(t; ˆ ω,ω;ω) =
πσ2













g(t; ˆ ω,ω;ω) =
πσ2






πn(ˆ ω − ω)






The hazard rate of the ﬁrst hitting time, conditional on a rest unemployment spell starting
at time 0, i.e conditional on ω = ˆ ω, is
ˆ hr(t) ≡ lim
ω↑ˆ ω
ˆ g(t; ˆ ω,ω,ω)
1 − ˆ G(t; ˆ ω,ω,ω) − G(t; ˆ ω,ω,ω)
and hr(t) ≡ lim
ω↑ˆ ω
g(t; ˆ ω,ω,ω)
1 − ˆ G(t; ˆ ω,ω,ω) − G(t; ˆ ω,ω,ω)
.
Equation (38) follows using L’Hopital’s rule.
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45B Additional Appendixes not for Publication
B.1 Derivation Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
This appendix proves that if v(ω0) is given by:
v(ω0) =
  ¯ ω
ω
R(ω)Πω(ω;ω0)dω (47)
for an arbitrary continuous function R( ) and where the local time function Πω( ) is given as
in Stokey (2006) Proposition 10.4:
Πω(ω;ω0) =

     
     
 
ζ2eζ1ω0+ζ2¯ ω − ζ1eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ω0  
ζ2eζ2(ω−ω) − ζ1eζ1(ω−ω) 
(ρ + λ)(ζ2 − ζ1)
 
eζ1ω+ζ2¯ ω − eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ω  if ω ≤ ω < ω0
 
ζ2eζ1ω0+ζ2ω − ζ1eζ1ω+ζ2ω0  
ζ2eζ2(¯ ω−ω) − ζ1eζ1(¯ ω−ω) 
(ρ + λ)(ζ2 − ζ1)
 
eζ1ω+ζ2¯ ω − eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ω  if ω0 ≤ ω ≤ ¯ ω,
(48)
where ζ1 < 0 < ζ2 are the two roots of the characteristic equation ρ + λ = µζ + σ2
2 ζ2, then






Proof. Diﬀerentiating v with respect to ω0 we get
v
′(ω0) =















where we use that Πω is continuous but Πωω0 has a jump at ω = ω0. Then





























Using the functional form of Πω we have, for ω < ω0 :
Πω(ω;ω0) = e





ζ2eζ2(ω−ω) − ζ1eζ1(ω−ω) 
(ρ + λ)(ζ2 − ζ1)
 
eζ1ω+ζ2¯ ω − eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ω 
and ˜ h2(ω) =
ζ1eζ1¯ ω 
ζ2eζ2(ω−ω) − ζ1eζ1(ω−ω) 
(ρ + λ)(ζ2 − ζ1)
 
eζ1ω+ζ2¯ ω − eζ1¯ ω+ζ2ω .
Thus for all ω < ω0:


















ζ2ω0˜ h2(ω) = 0











Using a symmetric calculation for ω > ω0 we have:










Next, diﬀerentiating Πω(ω;ω0) when ω < ω0 and when ω > ω0 and let ω → ω0 from below









Then use the expression for the roots: ζ1ζ2 = −(ρ + λ)/(σ2/2). Putting this together proves
the result.  
B.2 Market Social Planner’s Problem
In this section we introduce a dynamic programming problem whose solution gives the equi-
librium value for the thresholds ω, ¯ ω. This problem has the interpretation of a ﬁctitious social
planner located in a given market who maximizes net consumer surplus by deciding how many
of the agents currently located in the market work and how many rest and whether to adjust
the number of workers in the market. The equivalence of the solution of this problem with
the equilibrium value of the labor market participant has the following implications. First, it
47establishes that our market decentralization is rich enough to attain an eﬃcient equilibrium,
despite the presence of search frictions. Second, it gives an alternative argument to establish
the uniqueness of the equilibrium values for the thresholds ω and ¯ ω. Third, it connects our
results with the decision theoretic literature analyzing investment and labor demand model
with costly reversibility.
The market planner maximizes the net surplus from the production of the ﬁnal good in a
market with current log productivity ˜ x and l workers, taking as given aggregate consumption
C and aggregate output Y . The choices for this planner are to increase the number of
workers located in this market (hire), paying ¯ v to the households for each or them, or to
decrease the number of workers located at the market number (ﬁre), receiving a payment v
for each. Increases and decreases are non-negative, and the prices associated with them have
the dimension of an asset value, as opposed to a rental. We let M(˜ x,l) be the value function
of this planner, hence:
M(˜ x,l) = max
lh,lf
E




S(˜ x(t),l(t)) + vql(t)
 





  ˜ x(0) = ˜ x,l(0) = l
 
subject to dl(t) = −ql(t)dt + dlh(t) − dlf(t) and d˜ x = µxdt + σxdz. (49)
The lh(t) and lf(t) are increasing processes describing the cumulative amount of “hiring” and
“ﬁring” and hence dlh(t) and dlf(t) intuitively have the interpretation of hiring and ﬁring
during period t. The term ql(t)dt represent the exogenous quits that happens in a period
of length dt. The planner discounts at rate ρ + δ, accounting both for the discount rate of
households and for the rate at which her labor market disappears.
The function S(˜ x,l) denotes the return function of the market social planner per unit of
time and is given by











dy + br(l − E) + δlv.
The ﬁrst term is the consumer’s surplus associated with the particular good, obtained by
the output produced by E workers with log productivity ˜ x. The second term is value of the
workers that the planner chooses to send back to the household, receiving v for each. The
third term is the value of the “sale” of all the workers if the market shuts down. Setting
q = δ = br = 0 our problem is formally equivalent to Bentolila and Bertola’s (1990) model
of a ﬁrm deciding employment subject to a hiring and ﬁring cost and to Abel and Eberly’s
(1996) model of optimal investment subject to costly irreversibility, i.e. a diﬀerent buying
and selling price for capital.
48Using the envelope theorem, we ﬁnd that the marginal value of an additional worker is:



















where the function s( ) is given by s(ω) = max{eω,br}+δv and is identical to the expression
for the per-period value of a labor market participant in our equilibrium, except that δv is
in place of λv. This is critical to the equivalence between the two problems.
To prove this equivalence, we write the market social planner’s Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation. For each ˜ x, there are two thresholds, l(˜ x) and ¯ l(˜ x) deﬁning the range of inac-
tion. The value function M( ) and thresholds functions {l( ),¯ l( )} solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation if the following two conditions are met:
1. For all ˜ x, and l ∈ (l(˜ x), ¯ l(˜ x)) employment decays exponentially with the quits at rate
q and hence the value function M solves




M˜ x˜ x(˜ x,l). (51)
2. For all (˜ x,l) outside the interior of the range of inaction,




M˜ x˜ x(˜ x,l) ≤ S(˜ x,l), (52)
v = Ml(˜ x,l) ∀l ≥ ¯ l(˜ x), and ¯ v = Ml(˜ x,l) ∀l ≤ l(˜ x) (53)
Equation (53) is also referred to as smooth pasting. Since M(˜ x, ) is linear outside the range
of inaction, a twice-continuously diﬀerentiable solution implies super-contact, or that for all
˜ x :
0 = Mll(˜ x,¯ l(˜ x)) = Mll(˜ x,l(˜ x)). (54)
According to Veriﬁcation Theorem 4.1, Section VIII in Fleming and Soner (1993), a twice-
continuously diﬀerentiable function M(˜ x,l) satisfying equations (51), (53), and (54) solves
the market social planner’s problem.
If M is suﬃciently smooth, ﬁnding the optimal thresholds functions {l( ),¯ l( )} can be
stated as a boundary problem in terms of the function Ml(˜ x,l) and its derivatives. To see this,
49diﬀerentiate both sides of equation (51) with respect to l and replace Sl using equation (50):
(ρ + δ + q)Ml(˜ x,l) = s
 









M˜ x˜ xl(˜ x,l). (55)
If the required partial derivatives exist, any solution to the market social planner’s problem
must solve equations (53)–(55). Moreover, there is a clear relationship between the value
function v(ω) in the decentralized problem and the marginal value of a worker Ml in the
market social planner’s problem:
Lemma 2. Assume that θ  = 1 and that the functions Ml( ) and v( ) satisfy
Ml(˜ x,l) = v(ω), where ω =




and that thresholds functions {l( ),¯ l( )} and the thresholds levels {ω, ¯ ω} satisfy
log¯ l(˜ x) = logY + (θ − 1)(˜ x + logA) − θ(ω − logu
′(C)) (57)
logl(˜ x) = logY + (θ − 1)(˜ x + logA) − θ(¯ ω − logu
′(C)). (58)
Then, Ml( ) and {l( ),¯ l( )} solve equations (53)–(55) for all ˜ x and l ∈ [l(˜ x),¯ l(˜ x)] if and only
if v( ) and {ω, ¯ ω} solve equations (17).
Proof. Diﬀerentiate equation (56) with respect to ˜ x and l to get















Recall that a solution of equation (17) is equivalent to a solution to equations (19), (20), and
v(¯ ω) = ¯ v and v(ω) = v. The equivalence between equation (17) and equations (53)–(55) is
immediate, recalling that λ = q + δ, and the deﬁnitions of µ and σ.  
This lemma has important implications. First, it establishes, not surprisingly, that the
equilibrium allocation is Pareto Optimal. Second, since the market social planner’s problem
is a maximization problem, the solution is easy to characterize. For instance, since the
problem is convex, it has at most one solution and hence the equilibrium value of a labor
market participant is uniquely deﬁned, for given u′(C) and Y . The fact that v is increasing
is then equivalent to the concavity of S(˜ x, ). Finally, notice that Proposition 1 in Section
504.3 we establish existence and uniqueness of the solution to equation (17) only under mild
conditions on s( ), i.e. that it was weakly increasing and bounded below. Proposition 1 can
be used to extend the uniqueness and existence results of the literature of costly irreversible
investment to a wider class of production functions. Currently the literature uses that the
production function is of the form xax lal for some constants ax and al, with 0 < al < 1, as
in Abel and Eberly (1996). Proposition 1 shows that the only assumption required is that
the production function be concave in l, and that the marginal productivity of the factor l
can be written as a function of the ratio of the quantity of the input l to (a power of) the
productivity shock x.
51